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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUDY A. CORDOVA, * 
• 
Plaintiff- * 
Appellee, * Case No. 920370-CA 
v. * 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau * 
Chief, Records Bureau, Drivers * 
License Division, * Argument Priority No. -16-
• 
Defendant- * 
Appellant. * 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is in the Court of Appeals based upon Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(a) (1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Does the district court's review of the record created 
in an informal administrative adjudication satisfy the 
requirement of "trial de novo" in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 
(Supp. 1992)? This is a question of law and, consequently, this 
Court should accord no deference to the district court's judgment 
but should review it under a "correctness" standard. State v. 
1 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991); Rollins v. Petersen, 
813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 
795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990); State v. Humphreys, 794 P.2d 
496, 497 (Utah App. 1990); Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 
513, 516 (Utah) cert, denied U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 120 (1990). 
B. If the District Court on a trial de novo may review and 
base its ruling on the administrative record, does failure to 
appear and present the issue of the legal inadequacy of the 
evidence at the administrative hearing preclude a Petitioner from 
arguing in the district court that the evidence is legally 
insufficient under the residuum rule? This also is a question of 
law, and the same standard of review applies to this issue as to 
the one above. 
C. If the district court on a trial de novo may base its 
ruling on the administrative record and the evidence presented 
there by applying the residuum rule, was the documentary evidence 
admitted at the administrative hearing with no objection from the 
Petitioner comepetent evidence satisfying the residuum rule, even 
though it was unobjected-to-admissible hearsay? This too is a 
question of law; no deference should be given to the district 
court's judgment, and review should be under a "correctness" 
standard. 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
A copy of the determinative statue, Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-15 (Supp. 1992), is attached as Addendum "F." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the final judgment and decree of the 
Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, The Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick presiding. 
Appellee Judy A. Cordova's driving license was suspended for 
a period of ninety days following an informal adjudicative 
proceeding before the Department of Public Safety, Drivers 
License Division (the "Department"). Cordova petitioned for 
judicial review of the Department's decision by way of a trial de 
novo in district court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 
(Supp. 1992). 
Before trial de novo, Cordova moved to vacate and set aside 
the administrative order based upon a claimed lack of a "residuum 
of competent evidence" because the officer did not appear at the 
administrative hearing and testify. The motion was granted, 
final judgment was entered on May 15, 1992, and the Notice of 
Appeal was filed June 5, 1992. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
On January 24, 1992, Cordova was arrested for driving under 
the influence of an intoxicating beverage. (DUI Report Form at 1 
(Attached as Addendum "A"); Record ("R") at 17.) She was 
requested to submit to a chemical breath test and agreed to do 
so. The test results indicated that her breath alcohol content 
was .169 percent. (R. at 19.) On behalf of the Department, the 
arresting officer served the Petitioner with notice of intention 
to suspend her driving privileges in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-130 (Supp. 1992). (R. at 2.) Petitioner requested an 
administrative hearing before the Department, and one was 
scheduled for February 19, 1992 at 9:(30 a.m. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law ("Findings") at 2; R. at 45, Attached as 
Addendum "G") Cordova was notified of the hearing by first class 
mail on February 6, 1992. 
At the time set for the hearing, neither Cordova, her 
attorney, nor the officer appeared. (Findings at 2; R. at 45.) 
The hearing officer reviewed the Department's file and the 
reports submitted by the police officer, including: the DUI 
report form, the notice of citation and intent to suspend, the 
completed intoxilyzer operational check list, the intoxilyzer 
result card, and the Department's record of intoxilyzer test and 
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affidavit for the day of January 22, 1992. (Findings at 2; R. at 
45) The hearing officer then made the following findings: 
There was a reason to make the initial stop of the 
Petitioner, i.e., excessive speed. There was reasonable 
suspicion that the Petitioner was DUI, i.e., her 
admission that she had been drinking, odor of alcohol, 
slurred and slowed speech, impaired balance and 
Nystagmus in both eyes. She was properly warned and 
took the breath test. There is a check list for the 
breath machine in evidence, showing that all procedures 
were followed and a test result card with breath sample 
showing .169 BrAC and no indication that there were 
problems with the test or machine. The preponderance 
of evidence would support a suspension in this case. 
Department of Public Safety, Driver License Division, Findings of 
Proceedings on Hearings for Administrative Suspension at 4; R. at 
42 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, "Transcript," Attached as Addendum 
"E". ) 
Based upon those findings and determinations, the Department 
suspended the driving privilege of the Petitioner. (Findings at 
2; R. at 45.) 
Cordova brought an action for judicial review by trial de 
novo in district court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 
(Supp. 1992). (R. at 2.) Instead of trial de novo, the district 
court held a hearing wherein it granted Cordova's motion to 
vacate and set aside the administrative order based upon a 
claimed lack of a "residuum of competent evidence." The 
district court concluded that it "is not compelled to hold a 
5 
trial de novo in all cases." (Findings at 3; R. at 46.) From 
this order to vacate and set aside, Defendant appealed. (R. at 
53.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Prior to 1988, "per se" driver's license suspension hearings 
were on the record and the residuum rule was applied on judicial 
review. Since 1988, and the adoption of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA), the Department's adjudicative hearings are 
informal proceedings, and judicial review is by trial de novo in 
the district court. Trial de novo contemplates a complete 
retrial upon new evidence in which the* reccrd below becomes 
irrelevant. Therefore, the district court erred when it failed 
to conduct a trial de novo and instead based its judgment on 
review of the informal adjudicative record and application of the 
"residuum rule." 
POINT II 
Even if the "residuum rule" is applicable in the district 
court's de novo review of the Department's informal 
adjudications, Cordova is precluded from raising an issue for the 
first time on appeal when she failed to appear at the 
administrative hearing and raise it at that level. Cordova 
failed to argue the "residuum rule" at the administrative hearing 
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A., UAPA CHANGED J UDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT'S DRIVER-a 
LICENSE SUSPENSION HEARINGS FROM "REVIEW OF THE RECORD" TO 
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Prior to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (IIAPA)
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judicial review of "per se" driver's license suspensions was a 
review of the administrative record:1 
Any person denied a license or whose license has been 
cancelled, suspended or revoked by the department ... 
shall have the right to file a petition within thirty 
days for a hearing in the matter in a court of record 
in the county wherein such person shall reside and such 
court is hereby vested with jurisdiction and it shall 
be its duty to set the matter for hearing upon ten days 
written notice to the department. The court's 
jurisdiction is limited to a review of the record to 
determine whether or not the department's decision was 
arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-20 (1953)(Supp. 1985)(emphasis 
added)(current version at Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-131)(1988) . 
Judicial review by "review of the record" clearly provides a 
forum for application of the "residuum rule." Under this 
statutory framework, Utah courts held that the rule applied to 
judicial review of the decision of the Department's 
administrative Hearing Officers. McMillin v. Matheson, 741 P.2d 
960, 961 (Utah 1987); Williams v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1354, 
1356 (Utah App. 1987); Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 414 
(Utah App. 1987) . 
1
 "Per se" hearings arise out of an intoxilyzer result 
indicating a breath alcohol concentration above .08 percent; no 
other condition is required for suspension. "Refusal hearings" 
arise out of the motorist's refusal to submit to a chemical test. 
Judicial review of a "refusal hearing" has always been by trial de 
novo. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 .10 (b) (1953) (providing for 
review of refusal hearings by trial de novo)(amended 1987 Utah Laws 
ch. 138, now superseded by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (Supp. 
1992)). 
8 
'• UAPA maip * vu cnanqes nf importance I1. Mii*. MSI'1 ' • • !• ' „ 
U< language n,, ITIul. I od*-- A.ii. !'-,. 41, «2-- 20 that 
ptM-wided i .M: ia. review : per s* c ive: - , . "ense 
su f=r^r°, • "= r - ^  < . ^  
v ^ provioed i^: judicial review 
Hti M', 1* r ; .forn.ai adiudire- . VH nrcceedj tah 
Cod*- Arr 
9 J , « U w d l x ' . i p i v_ v -v J* , . M v- ci . • ) ill \JL illd * 1 . "" J - 6 
( 1 9 9 . " he t i r .«• • : - >\n- b e f o r e t h i s -'.n. < <• >;>^t>^* I M
 V a 
j e p a i l i n e l i i v * i renins b u b p e n s . o n h e a r ] J \ s a t i r - f i e d by 
t h e ' i i s t r i v ' Miur : <- T . \ - , P V * * * >i^  i r ' o r r ^ l ^.i * wn* •-;>* • — e c o r d . 
i n " J : ~ i c i r e 1 - .- * -i iji-i n i s* i a t I ve y- t ' . rie f i r s t 
c o m p l e t e r e : ; i s * i "->: • *-•-• *^ * < • - . , - *-- -*.— 
i ^; ,„ & R i o 
G r a n d e W. R . k . v ^ P u b l i c S e r v . Comm'n, 9 >- U t a r • i : 
554 (19 4 0 ) ; s e e a l s o U n i v e r s i t y ul Utdli v , I n d u s t r i a l floriui 
! „ ' " | [1 "il I ' I U " ' ] . P l e d g e r v . Coy , fi?0 i1 ?d I I 1 , ' 
( U t a h 1 9 8 1 ) . 
P l e d g e r ^ rPTf r^ - • v~ : - • 
t h e s t a t u t e . *
 : , . _, . remeni a p p e a r s ; 
and, (2) the nature of the administrative body, the decision and 
procedure being reviewed. Pledger, 626 P.2d at 416-17. Both 
parts of the analysis require that "trial de novo," in the 
context of judicial review of driver's license suspension 
hearings, mean a complete retrial upon new evidence. 
1. Statutory Context. 
UAPA provides for two types of judicial review depending on 
the form of the administrative adjudicative proceeding. In 
formal adjudicative proceedings, a formal record with sworn 
testimony and cross-examination is required. See Utah Code Ann. § 
6 3-46b-8 (1989). Judicial review of formal adjudications is on 
the record in either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989). In contrast, in informal 
adjudicative proceedings no record need be created. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-5 (1989). Judicial review is by trial de novo 
in the district court. Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-15 (Supp. 1992). 
"Trial de novo," in the context of judicial review of 
administrative action where no record need be created, must be a 
complete retrial upon new evidence rather than a trial on the 
basis of the record, since the latter may be an impossibility. 
Further support for this definition of trial de novo is 
found in UAPA's correlation between the court of review and the 
form of review. An appellate court's expertise is in an "on the 
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from administrative action a closer judicial scrutiny than a mere 
review of the record of agency action." Id. 
The definition of trial de novo as a complete retrial upon 
new evidence accords with this Court's pronouncement in 
Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 (Utah App. 1990). 
Regarding judicial review of a driver1s's license suspension, 
this Court noted: 
It seems clear that no prejudice would ordinarily occur 
when an informal hearing is held under the UAPA because 
the litigant has an absolute right to a trial de novo 
before the district court. In the trial de novo, 
Brinkerhoff was able to present his entire case before 
a new tribunal for an independent decision. 
Brinkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 590. 
The district court cannot preserve the motorist's right to 
"present his entire case before a new tribunal for an independent 
decision" if it merely reviews the administrative record and 
bases its judgment thereon. Thus, the second prong of the 
Pledger test, i.e., "the nature of the administrative body, the 
decision and procedure being reviewed," also requires that "trial 
de novo" in the context of judicial review of the Department's 
driver's license suspension hearings mean a complete retrial upon 
new evidence. The district court erred when it failed to conduct 
a trial de novo and instead entered judgment on the basis of the 
residuum rule. 
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by "tria 'i i 
because . . -.**.,* ^i . . v cr.di, << * LIK- .3.- :* :*••-*•'% :< • Me 
Department ' ^  ^ ^ p e nsi^r hoarinqr » 11 hough pnct-.n^vA ^ c i s i o n s 
b y l II11 s f n 
other administrative proceedings, none have done so in the 
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context of judicial review of informal adjudicative hearings 
brought to the district court under UAPA's remedy of trial de 
novo. See, e.g. , Wagstaff v. Dep't of Employment S e c , 826 P. 2d 
1069, 1072 n.2 (Utah App. 1992) (appellate review of formal 
administrative proceeding); Adams v. Board of Review of the 
Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991) (appellate review of 
formal administrative proceeding); Tolman v. Salt Lake County 
Attorney, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991) (petition for 
extraordinary writ under Utah R. Civ. Pro. 65(b)); Mayes v. 
Dep't of Employment Sec, 754 P.2d 989, 992 n.l (Utah App. 1988) 
(appellate review under Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-10(i) (1987)). 
Because of the recognized trend in other jurisdictions to abandon 
application of the residuum rule, see Wagstaff v. Dep't of 
Employment Sec., 826 P.2d 1069, 1072 n.2 (Utah App. 1992) (citing 
3 Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 16.6 (2d ed. 
1980)); Mayes v. Dep't of Employment Sec, 754 P.2d 989, 992 
(Utah App. 1992), this Court should limit application of the 
"residuum rule" to judicial review that is based on the 
administrative record. The "residuum rule" cannot apply to trial 
de novo where the administrative record is irrelevant, and for 
this reason, the district court erred in this case when it based 
its judgment upon it. 
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II. CORDOVA CANNOT RAISE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AN ISSUE 
SHE FAILED TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE HEARING OFFICER. 
Generally, appellate courts only consider questions which 
were raised and preserved in the lower tribunal. See Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 800-01 (Utah 1991); Loveland 
v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 767 (Utah 1987). The corollary 
is that an appellant cannot assert an argument for the first time 
on appeal. See Banqerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983); 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987). 
This rule is equally applicable in the review of 
administrative proceedings. Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 
587, 589 (Utah App. 1990). In State v. Utah Merit System 
Council, 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a party who did not object to the failure to administer an 
oath in an administrative hearing could not raise that issue in 
the subsequent judicial review: "Because no timely objection was 
made in the administrative hearing, the matter was not 
appropriately raised before the district court." Utah Merit 
System, 614 P.2d at 1261. Further, "[a] party must raise an 
objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its right to litigate 
the issue in subsequent proceedings." Brinkerhoff v. 
Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah App. 1990)(involving a 
driver's license suspension). 
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The test for whether an issue has been preserved for appeal 
was set forth by this Court in LeBaron & Associates v. Rebel 
Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Utah App. 1991)f as follows: 
"To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely 
bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus 
providing the court an opportunity to rule on the issue's 
merits." Because Cordova failed to object to the evidence or to 
argue a failure of proof at the administrative hearing, she 
failed to bring the "residuum rule" issue to the attention of the 
hearing officer and denied him the opportunity to rule on the 
issue's merits. On appeal to the district court, Cordova should 
be precluded from claiming that failure to apply the "residuum 
rule" was error because of her failure to preserve the issue. 
See Brinkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 589; LeBaron & Associates, 823 P.2d 
at 482-83. 
This Court cannot condone the practice Cordova has relied 
upon in pursuing this appeal. Allowing parties to by-pass the 
administrative hearing and then argue on appeal to the district 
court that the evidence presented against them at the hearing was 
objectionable would vitiate the purpose of the administrative 
hearing. In S & G Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990), an 
interested party failed to appear and present evidence at a 
hearing before the state engineer. The Utah Supreme Court 
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refused to allow the party to present the evidence upon review de 
novo in the district court. The court's reasoning is instructive 
in this case. 
The requirement of participation as a prerequisite to 
standing to appeal is a corollary of the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is well 
settled under this doctrine that persons aggrieved by 
decisions of administrative agencies "may not, by 
refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to sxich 
agencies, by-pass them, and call upon the courts to 
determine ... the matters properly determinable 
originally by such agencies." 
S & G, Inc., 797 P.2d at 1087, quoting People v. Keith Ry. 
Equip. C O M 70 Cal. App. 2d 339, 346 161 P.2d 244, 249 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1945). 
The rule of waiver precludes Cordova from raising the 
residuum rule issue on appeal to the district court when she 
failed to bring the issue to the attention of the administrative 
hearing officer. If trial de novo is a review of the record, the 
district court should have reviewed the record to insure that 
Cordova had preserved the residuum rule issue below. Failing to 
do so, the district court erred when it reversed the 
administrative ruling on the basis of this new argument. 
III. CORDOVA'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE EVIDENCE AT THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING RENDERED THE EVIDENCE LEGALLY COMPETENT 
AND SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RESIDUUM RULE. 
In order to complain of the admission of evidence, a party-
must make a clear and definite objection to the admission of the 
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evidence. Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1); State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 
29, 34-35 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989); State v. 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982); Stacrmever v. Leatham 
Brothers, 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279, 282 (1968). 
"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the [rules of evidence]." Utah R. Evid. 402. There 
are various objections to evidence which, unless made, are 
waived, making the evidence admissible*. See, e.g. , State v. 
Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah 1989); Cook Asocs. Inc. v. 
Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Utah 1983); State v. Belqard, 811 
P.2d 211, 213-215 (Utah App. 1991). Even admissible "hearsay" 
evidence, if there is no objection based on lack of foundation 
for admission of the evidence as an exception to the hearsay 
rule, is competent evidence that satisfies the requirements of 
the "residuum rule." See Industrial Power Contractors v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 31 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
Cordova's failure to appear and object to admission of the 
admissible hearsay evidence at the administrative hearing 
precludes a reviewing court from concluding that such evidence 
was incompetent and, precludes a district court's conclusion that 
the residuum rule was not satisfied. In Industrial Power 
Contractors, Wanona Johnson brought a claim against Industrial 
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Power Contractors (IPC) for dependents' benefits before the 
Industrial Commission. The issue was whether Johnson's husband 
had died as a result of an industrial accident. Johnson 
introduced her deceased husband's medical records into evidence 
to prove the causal connection between the alleged industrial 
accident and his death. Based on these records, which were the 
only evidence of Johnson's involvement in the accident, the 
Commission awarded Johnson benefits. 
On appeal, IPC argued that the medical records were hearsay 
and insufficient to support the Commission's findings under the 
"residuum rule." This Court rejected IPC's argument thus: 
Foundational defects, unless timely objected to, 
are deemed waived and the evidence is deemed competent. 
In this instance, IPC failed to challenge the 
foundation of the medical records before the Commission 
below; therefore, IPC cannot question their competence 
for the first time on appeal. 
The medical records from Utah reveal that Johnson 
was being treated for a cough and congestion as well as 
heart problems. Johnson's account therein of climbing 
stairs and inhaling fumes during an attempted rescue of 
a co-worker provides a factual explanation as to the 
cause or external source for the symptoms, pain, or 
sensations being treated. Absent a foundational 
challenge, the records would have been admissible in a 
court of law under Rule 803(4) as an express exception 
to the hearsay rule. 
The residuum rule requires that findings be 
supported by a residuum of legally competent evidence, 
not that they be supported by "non-hearsay" evidence. 
Certain hearsay evidence is admissible in a court of 
law and is therefore legally competent. Since the 
Commission's findings in this case were based on 
admissible hearsay, they were based upon legally 
competent evidence. IPC's failure to raise its 
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foundational challenges below presents IPC from raising 
them for the first time on appeal. We therefore hold 
that the requirements of the residuum rule were 
satisfied. 
Industrial Power Contractors, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31 (citations 
omitted). 
The reasoning in Industrial Power Contractors, is equally 
applicable in the instant case: the DUI report (Attached as 
Addendum "A"), the operational check list, (Attached as Addendum 
"B"), the intoxilyzer test result, (Attached as Addendum "C"), 
and the Department's Intoxilyzer test affidavit, (Attached as 
Addendum "D"), admitted without objection, are all competent 
evidence to support the Hearing Officer's findings. The DUI 
report showed that Cordova had been driving at excessive speed 
and the arresting officer had reason to make the initial stop. 
The DUI report recorded Cordova's admission that she had been 
drinking and the officer's report of an odor of alcohol, 
Cordova's slurred and slowed speech, impaired balance and 
Nystagmus in both eyes, which show probable cause for the arrest. 
The DUI report also indicated that Cordova had been properly 
warned and took the breath test. Absent a foundational 
objection, the DUI report is a public record and competent 
evidence. See Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah App. 
1987); Triplett v. Schwendiman, 754 P,2d 87, 89 (Utah App. 1988). 
The intoxilyzer checklist, the test result of 1.69%, and the 
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affidavit showing the machine had been tested and was working 
properly are similarly competent, absent foundational objection, 
as business records, Triplett, 754 P.2d at 89, or under Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5 (1988). 
Thus, even if this Court determines that the "residuum rule" 
should apply to judicial review of driver's license suspension 
hearings, the rule was satisfied when Cordova failed to object 
and her DUI records were admitted as competent evidence. 
"Absent a foundational challenge, the records would have been 
admissible in a court of law under Rule 803(4) [in this case Rule 
803(8)] as an express exception to the hearsay rule." Industrial 
Power Contractors, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. The trial court 
thus erred as a matter of law in concluding that the residuum 
rule was not satisfied in this case. 
If trial de novo means a complete retrial upon new evidence, 
see Part I herein, the rule of waiver, like the "residuum rule" 
is irrelevant. The Department's arguments in Points II and III 
are necessary only if this Court concludes that trial de novo 
means an on the record review that makes the "residuum rule" 
applicable. 
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CONCLUSION 
Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding such 
as a driver's license suspension hearing lies with the district 
court by trial de novo. A trial de novo in the context of 
driver's license suspension hearings is a complete retrial upon 
new evidence. The district court erred when it failed to conduct 
such a review. Trial de novo is incompatible with application of 
the residuum rule and, consequently, this Court should reverse 
the district court's judgment granting relief to Cordova based 
upon its review of a portion of the administrative record and its 
application of the "residuum rule." This case should then be 
remanded to the district court for a proper "trial de novo." 
If this court determines that the "residuum rule" applies, 
Cordova's failure to properly raise or preserve the "residuum 
rule" issue in the administrative proceeding precludes the 
district court from basing its decision on that issue. 
Consequently, this Court must reverse the district court's 
action. 
Similarly, even if this Court determines that the "residuum 
rule" applies, the evidence presented at the administrative 
hearing was legal, competent, and sufficient to support the 
Department's findings. Thus, the judgment below should be 
22 
reversed in light of the competent evidence supporting the 
Department's findings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th is J) day of September, 1992 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
23 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing.BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT, was mailed, postage-prepaid 
this O v"^ 1 day of September, 1992, to the following: 
Herschel Bullen, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
2749 Parleys Way, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
1 
ADDENDUM 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ADD. 
DUI REPORT FORM 2 
OPERATIONAL CHECK LIST 9 
INTOXILYZER TEST RESULT 11 
INTOXILYZER TEST AFFIDAVIT 13 
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING REPORT 17 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 22 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 24 
ADDENDUM "A" 
DUI REPORT FORM 
ADD. 2 
WSJmiTlS^l**J fVML/ V / M A I I U u 
STATE^F UTAH 
COUNTY OF - ft lAh~£ 
A 
CITY OF £>.syfi -ic/ ^,fj.\J 
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAFMN: 
JHTOF S* - ' 
ATEOAT t" ' * * f ' ^ * ~ 
Ms than (5) nor mora than (14) day* attar iasuanea 
* citation. 
AGENCY Stt^h ic,/V/»»..sJ 
NAME 
7055KES5 
\<pcto( 1D108514 
(Middle) 
/ / f / v ' i / * £ 
TCrtyf 
< ft? J>< 
(State)^ 
Driver License No. 
2H Zj - J i 
Height 
Zehicle Make 
Class 
Weight, 
Expires 
lyes 
Vehicle Type 
ifl 
Year 
State (Restriction 
Sex 
h 
Color 
Social Security No. 
T7-7- £•'/ 
25: £v.. £ 
Vehicle Ucenae No. . _ 
Accident 
DV«S$Nc 
im. Vehicle 
DYts UNO 
Motorcycle 
D Y « C?No 
State 
Haz. Material 
O Yes >5 No 
Expires 
Direction of Travel 
N SiPw 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING; 
D UTAH CODE • COUNTY CODE_X CITY CODE NO.: 7 ' - / ? ^ / C * 
ON THE > H DAY OF «-* ^ ^ 1 9 I L T ^ M I L I T A R Y TIME - " * * 
LOCATION. 
VIOLATIONS): 
_ ^ 
. MILE POST NO. 
OUT 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT I PROMJSE T O ^ P E A R AS DIRECTED HEREIN 
SIGNATURE / V » 
=*= 
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS SUMMONS AND CITATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT 
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE 
NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW I FURTHER CER-
TIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER 
COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7.10. U.C.A. 
OFPICPR {'? <?*" yj <^— BADGE NO 
COMPLAINAI K/IL 
/ 
s r^f? DATE OF CITATION 
PERSE M A I L T O - DRIVER 'S LICENSE D I V I S I O N P. O. BOX 30560 SALT LAKE CITY, U T A H 84130-0560 
DATE SENT TO DLD DOCKET NO. 
JAN 2 6 1992 / A o ^ , 
READ CAREFULLY 
JHoar tonse'nt.T? arnnf< his citation is not an information and will not be used as an information withourydo conse t. f ri formation is filed you will be 
rovided a copy by the court. You MUST appear in court on or before the time set in this citation. IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AN 
^FORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST. 
OTICE OF INTENT TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE: You are hereby notified that thirty-one (31) days from the date of this notice your 
rivilege to operate motor vehicles in the State of Utah will be suspended pursuant to Section 41-2-130 UCA for a period of ninety (90) 
ays thereafter, or for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days if this is the second or subsequent occurrence of this offense OR if a 
eace officer has indicated you have refused to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol and drug content of your 
reath, blood or urine, you are hereby notified that thirty-one (31) days from the date of this notice your privilege to operate 
lOtor vehicles in the State of Utah will be revoked pursuant to 41-6-44.10 UCA for a period of one (1) year. YOU HAVE THE 
IGHT TO REQUEST A HEARING ON THIS SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION. The hearing is not for purpose of granting you a 
nited license but only to determine whether your license should be suspended or revoked. 
The department will NOT contact you further regarding a hearing unless you request a hearing in writing. Your WRITTEN 
EQUEST must be sent WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS of the date of arrest to the DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION at 4501 South 2700 West, 
O. Box 30560, Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560. Upon your timely written request for a hearing you will be notified of a time and place 
appear. If you fail to appear or request a hearing, your driver license suspension or revocation will become effective as indicated 
>ove. The administrative hearing is civil in nature and does not satisfy the requirement for you to appear in court when required. 
•COMMERCIAL DRIVER LICENSE HOLDERS SEE REVERSE SIDE 
•MPORARY DRIVER LICENSE: 
1 This is VALID as a temporary driver license for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of this notice. 
] This is NOT VALID as a temporary driver license. 
) This IS valid as a temporary Commercial Driver License for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of this Notice. 
) This is NOT valid as a temporary Commercial Driver License. 
ason for not issuing temporary license: 
ADD. 3 
yuivuvtynio n j ^ y v n m I ^ I , 
STATE OF UTAH 
•UNTY OF. 1, ADDRESS 
fYOF 
•HE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
IVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN: 
OF 
D A T 
than (5) nor more than (14) days after issuance 
itation. 
TJAME <Ust) (First) (Middle) 
TdtyT (State) 
Driver License No 
Heiflht* 
Vehicle Make 
Class 
Weight 
Expires 
Eyes 
Vehicle Type Year 
State [Restriction 
Sex 
Color 
Social Security No. 
DOB 
Zip 
Vehicle License No. 
Accident 
OYes DNo 
Comm. Vehicle 
D Y M D N O 
Motorcycle 
D Y M ED No 
State 
Haz. Material 
D Y M O N O 
Expires 
Direction of Travel 
N S E W 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: 
D UTARCODE D COUNTY CODE. & CITY CODE NO.: 7 ~ ' 
ON THE ^ DAY OF ' ' ' 19 MILITARY TIME . 
LOCATION . /£ ~ ~ WILE POST HOJTJJ^ , j / 
VIOLATION(S) M-
±Mt 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN 
SIGNATURE ^  
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS SUMMONS AND CITATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT 
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE: DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE 
NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW I FURTHER CER-
TIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPE& 
COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-19, U.C.A. 
OFFICER. 
"/- .BADGE NO 
COMPLAINANT L S DATE OF CITATION 
ISSUING AGENCY COPY 
DATE SENT TO DLD DOCKET NO 
oh" 
READ CAREFULLY 
lis citation is not an information and will not be used as an information without your consent. If an information is fiTed you will be 
Dvided a copy by the court You MUST appear in court on or before the time set in this citation. IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AN 
FORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST. 
3TICE OF INTENT TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE: You are hereby notified that thirty-one (31) days from the date of.this notice your 
ivilege to operate motor vehicies in the State of Utah will be suspended pursuant to Section 41-2-130 UCA for a penod of ninety (90) 
lys thereafter, or for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days if this is the second or subsequent occurrence of this offense OR If a 
race officer has indicated you have refused to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol and drug content of your 
eath, blood or urine, you are hereby notified that thirty-one (31) days from the date of this notice your privilege to operate 
otor vehicles in the State of Utah will be revoked pursuant to 41-6-44.10 UCA for a period of one (1) year. YOU HAVE THE 
GHT TO REQUEST A HEARING ON THIS SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION. The hearing is not for purpose of granting you a 
nited license but only to determine whether your license should be suspended or revoked. 
The department will NOT contact you further regarding a hearing unless you request a hearing in writing. Your WRITTEN 
EQUEST must be sent WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS of the date of arrest to the DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION at 4501 South 2700 West, 
O. Box 30560, Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560. Upon your timely written request for a hearing you will be notified of a time and place 
appear. If you fail to appear or request a hearing, your driver license suspension or revocation will become effective as indicated 
>ove. The administrative hearing is civil in nature and does not satisfy the requirement for you to appear in court when required. 
COMMERCIAL DRIVER LICENSE HOLPEft&SEE BEVERSE SIDE 
EMPORARY DRIVER LICENSE: 
5 This is VALID as a temporary driver license for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of this notice. 
] This is NOT VALID as a temporary driver license. 
] This IS valid as a temporary Commercial Driver License for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of this Notice. 
D This is NOT valid as a temporary Commercial Driyer License. 
eason for not issuing temporary license: 
U 1 U 0 0 1 4 
>' /KWi-
I. 
II. 
DUI REPORT FORM 
CASE IDENTIFICATION: 
Data r -JM-^X Day F*l64<r Arairient XA> Case # 4±olo/ Time Prepared J ? ^ Q 
Subject's Name n^'r A- cortdni/M Address v a ^ c < - ^ ^ / / ^ g / / -
Place of Employment /?• c TZ#*JJJ£J? < 
Home Telephone Number 
D.O.B. 4 - ^ - S ^ 
Place of Arrest tt?*Js* 
Sres-GZlA? 
Address ft ?^ > 
Arresting Officer j£_ 
Arresting Agency £?«^3 
Driver License # 3 4 £%l Z- I 
_*_ n*o *~> Charges 
Work Telephone Number 
/>»>^Vi, 
. Time of Arrest ^-"?A3 
jt?rJ 
Assisting Officers *?« £e*?J6^ - >»? T4JC «J 
JL * *x 
VEHICLE 
Year 7 S Color /?£-/> 
License # and state RAl-4Ay UT 
Registered Owner 6r«~7~ FW/Z/tAJJ 
. Disposition £*+<& "TAX i~,fo-H-,\ 
Make £~f~ t-^li 
. Address 3A.o c 4+*Aitte c,r 
III. WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically) 
Name Address Tele. # Age/DOB 
IV. 
1. 
2. 
a 
4. 
5. ffi*Tte'*J mfcov siry-H>o& 
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL: 
The facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle are: 
I/I 7U firme* U-.T. A1? «7^**^ fi'H***.*^,* •>•*•*& • solicit. *~<* AVHAI 
eii*s</*J ^Jt 
IZhtJl** • 
•^ «,,YL &rs ,~ ru. 
DRIVING PATTERN: 
Subject's location when first observed 3- ^oo uJ - (oc)C*J /?«•*'«,? „r J ;«,„ 
(tie eijfd "••> ^'rf JA**1 e/**^ A r £±r The facts observed regarding drivino pattern. .-,-
*s 
• ^ * 
I. PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT: 
X t~> C0~it 
~y rp*»s 6<-tT€£( v/
0
* J? ^ J c 6U*S erf ~^<*VL. *~>/rts €o*-± >£'*~J£. 
^ / < f ^ 
I. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
Odor of alcoholic beverage k* +f/£S+*rr Zi^ll *4 +* «lce>L2l*t* l&/tsi^ *,** e*n,T&t^ fe^^Ti,*, ^^ 
Speech tl**«/ - 4l<"sSLJ • 
Balance^L^fefxy/^ £***: j £j?rU. 
Signs or complaints of injury or illness ^^ ^ & 
Other physical characteristics * ^ 
W* f f * wThr* d'fr. erfht^rj \ */<+)<r«i£ r* irk^t f fr>9m 
*
r a *<*, ^ " 3 A^ U~J* AuT To Ul 4,J* \r* k*>^Us 1>J*~^ 
5. K*i*tujt - cm &/*~*.\ **+n/<r. 
Were tests demonstrated by officer? ^ ^ Subject's ability to follow instructions u" «^ «J +-•$* 
X. SEARCHES 
A. Vehicle: i l : 
Was sutyert's^vphicle ge^ rphgd?^ Y& *> Where? tcxjoa ^ / 7<AJ> 
Person who performed the search <£"- 4~*rrt- / 
r— 
B. Subject: •& 
Was subject's person searched? 1^6 Where? /^</^*> J /7&o <<J£ 
When? >*f)4«r Y» »/^^gvidence Foupd ? >—>-< £-j**f j>n fttf*-* ^ 
Person who performed the search /£ * <^—-y^*- . £2 
X. CHEMICAL TESTS: 
Mr. or Mrs. CgfthpV A , do you understand that you are under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) 3^ A & . 
I hereby request that you submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) content of your blood/ 
breath. I request that you take a Kff£/9» / * / / test. 
M (blood-breath-urine) 
<? jg[ The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was adminis-
tered: 
Results indicating .08 grams or more by weight of alcohol in your blood/breath shall, and the existence 
of a blood alcohol content or presence of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a 
vehicle may, result in suspension or revocation of your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response . x * > . 
Did subject submit to a chemical test? _ Type of test Q( ^< T^ 
Test Administered by Cr PtKiYt* Where? tmp * nop UJ 
Time:J2 3 ^ f f Results * lA^ Was subject notified of results? 
Serial No. of test machine: 
ftf-bc /o 1SL- 0*the subject refuses the test, read the following) 
D The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, however I must warn you that if you refuse, your license or 
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited driver's license. 
After you have taken this test, you will be permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer 
a test at your own expense, in addition to the one I have requested you to submit to, so long as it does 
not delay the test or tests requested by me. Upon your request, I will make available to you the results 
of the test if you take it. I 
• The following admonition was given by me tathe subject: 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which 
is civil in nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent does not give you 
the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure. 
Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I will consider that you have refused to take the test. 
I warn you that if you refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with 
no provision for a limited license. 
XI. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: . 
Was subject advised of the following rights? ' ^ When *M I ^ 
By Whom? G < V , V 7 _ Where? M?6 Z / 7 Q o L ^ 
*^ 1. You have the right to remain silent. 
*r 2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
** 3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being ques-
tioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before 
any questioning, if you wish one. 
)> /X4. If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answer-
ing questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning. 
Were the following waiver questions asked? 
_>C 1. Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you? 
Response X 6<? 
y 2. Having these rights m mind, do you wish to talk to us now? . 
Response -T J*«+ sAeJ //fe £ *o*(J*,+ Jri**^* r^o 
INTERVIEW: 
Were you operating a vehicle? 
Wherp were you going? 
What street or highway were you on?
 E / 
Direction of travel? / 
Where did you start from? / 
When? What time te/ff now? 
What is today's date? -/&&i of week? 
(Actual time Date x Day 
What city or county are you in now? / 
What were you doing during the last three hqyrs? 
z 
Have you been drinking? . 
What? / How much? 
Where? X 
When did you have your fii^t drink? Last drink?. 
Are you under the influgfice of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now? 
Are you takino l^ranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind? 
(What kind^Get sample) 
When dmrou have the last dose? 
Are you ill? 
(If s>*Dject was in an accident, ask these questions:) 
Were you involved in an accident today? 
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident? 
If so, what? When? 
How murh? 
II. OTHER OCCURRENCES OR FACTS: 
III. ATTACHED DOCUMENTS: 
I have attached the following documents to this report: 
1. S, Copy of citation/temporary license 
2. & Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit 
3. D Traffic accident report 
4. & Other documents (specify) irtert TT*V . ^  ~ J «fci.^fe '""'*> r***?, fa <»!&< ^ T^T: 
hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer and that the information contained above in this report form and attached 
locuments is true and correct to my knowledge and belief and that this report form was prepared in the regular course of my 
luties. It is my belief the subject was in violation of section 41-6-44 U.CXA. at the date, time, and place specified in this report. 
Signature of Peace Officer * ^ . _ — w * S 
Law Enforcement Agency-y^Pi/ru 
Date: / - iA^%L Time: £>£>PQ 
The original of this form and the Driver License copy of the Citation must be 
sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to: 
Driver License Division 
4501 South 2700 West 
P.O. Box 30560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560 
Z6
 ^ / , r r 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
OPERATIONAL CHECK LIST 
ADD. 9 
CMI INTOXILYZER OPERATIONAL CHECK LIST 
South Jordan Police Department 
Serial #94001022 Model #401 IAS-A 
Subject J O j V U.^LOS/A Date_ili*jA9tX 
a.m. 
(4) Tlme^^ f~\ <gfjh). Operator^- ^ V C 
1. (<"pow er switch on, ready light on, connect 
£*^^pump tube to breath tube insert record 
^ ^ ^ 3 card, press advance and wait for light 2. 
2. vn Press advance, auto zero, wait for light 3 . 
3. (ct^Disconnect pump tube from breath tube, 
^ ^ S s extend breath tube, insert mouthpiece. 
4. (iT"Secure breath sample from subject, observe 
a3^"6£reath lamp while subject is blowing. 
5. {y Remove mouthpiece, iiouse breath tube, 
connect pump tube to breath tube, press 
^2-T^advance and wait for light 5. 
6. W Press advance, insert quartz calibrator, 
-SI wait for light 6, remove quartz calibrator. 
7 / 1 4 House breath tube, press advance, wait 
gaj^for light 7. 
8. (\/ Remove test card, end of test, turn power 
switch off. 
ADD. 10 
ADDENDUM "C" 
INTOXILYZER TEST RESULT 
ADD. 11 
TEST RECORD CARD FOR THE 
INTOXILYZER* INSTRUMENT-4011 MODELS 
GRAMS ALCOHOL PER 
7K LITHES BREATH 
A 
P 
A 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
n 
INSTRUMENT PRINT CODE 
A - AIR BLANK 
B - BREATH 
C — CALIBRATOR (Sknulatoi) 
OBSERVED SUBJECT 
FOR REQUIRED OBSERVATION 
PERIOD AND FOLLOWED 
CHECK LIST 
5«R?T6R?IN I ITIAL 
" * • •faTfciMtNUflgATiaH 
INSTRUMENT SERIAL NUMBER 
/ -2-H-<7X 
DATE 
8UMgflT'5H»ME - * -
^TMEFIRS ME FIRST OBSERVED TIME TEST STARTED 
OPERATOR 
ADOJTJ DJT10N. A l INFORMATION AND/OR REMARKS 
$4c-
(Jfp7<?s tiBsacy 
ADDENDUM "D" 
INTOXILYZER TEST AFFIDAVIT 
ADD. 13 
NORMAN H. BANGERTER. GOVERNOR 0. DOUGLAS BOORERO. COMMISSIONER 
BRANT JOHNSON. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
- - . „ I « t • ,r 
STATE OF UTAH 
D EPARTMENT 0 F P UBLIC SAFETY 
CUSTODIAN CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
1. I am the ^ Breathtesting Supervisor of the Utah Highway Patrol and 
the official keeper of and responsible for the maintenance check 
records of the breathtesting instruments maintained in the State of 
Utah. 
2. Attached are true and correct copies of the records of maintenance 
and certification for the Intoxilvzer serial number ^yy^^O/O 7-Z*~ 
located at.^c<^^ror-c^u^ P*& ,. of which are kept on file by 
me, in the course of official business, for the State of Utah, 
Department of Public Safety and in accordance with the current 
regulations of the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
3. The attached tests were done before and after the date 
4. The breathtest 'technicians(s) whose signature(s) appear on the 
attached affidavit(s)are certified by the State of Utah and 
has/have met all of the following requirements as required by the 
Department of Public Safety: 
Satisfactory completion of the operator's initial certification 
course and/or renewal course; 
Satisfactory completion of the Breath Alcohol Testing Supervisor's 
course offered by Indiana University, or an equivalent course of 
instruction, as approved by the Breath Alcohol Testing Program; 
Satisfactory completion of a Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument 
Manufacturer's Maintenance/Repair Technician course for the 
instruments in use in the State of Utah or is qualified by nature of 
his/her employment or training to maintain/repair those instruments; 
Maintain Technician's status through a minimum of eight (8) hours 
related training each calendar year. 
5. I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of 
the matters alleged in this at 
Sgt. Chrisfri^ ajiJjfreis^ friif^  
Breathtesting Supervisor 
Utah Highway Patrol 
19 9jL% PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE 
STATE OF U] 
COUNTY 
ON THE / 7 DAY 0~F 
ME, CHRISTIAAN KOORING, WHO BEING DULY SWORN BEFORE ME EXECUTED 
THE ABOVE REFERENCED CERTIFICATE AND I CERTIFY THAT SAID PERSON 
IS AN OFFICER AND EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND IS THE LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE 
INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVITS OF SAID DEPARTMENT AND THAT HIS 
SIGNATURE AFFIXED HERETO IS GENUINE.^ 
NOTA^ PUBLIC : A 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRE v.I N V A T: ^^Zi^c^f. -r 
ADD. 14 
NO 
yi£0_DEEl^_OE_EyBLIC_SAFETY^ (A) 
/We the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
1. Breath testing instrument INTOXILYZER, serial numberV^^fV^^Z^ 
located a t 5 ^ ^ Jftgkw/ '". .\ was pr.operly checked by me/us in 
the course of official duties, on 
2. This was done by a currently certified techinician and according to 
the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah 
Department of Public Safety, 
3- This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were 
made at the time these tests were done. 
4. I am/we are competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the 
matters alleged in this affidavit. 
'HE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: 
t/; Electrical power check: 
.(Power switch on power indicator light is on) 
^Temperature check (Ready light is on) 
^0 Internal purge check: 
(Air pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds. 
Zero set, Error indicator, and Printer Check: 
(Zero set at .000, .001, .002, .003.) 
(With proper zero set, printer works properly).., 
(Printer deactivated when error light is on)..... 
Fixed absorption calibrator test (if equipped) 
^ (Reads within +/- .01 of calibration setting)...« 
[ ^ O Checked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests 
within +/- .005 or 5% whichever is the greatest)... 
[ L) Gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters 
of breath. 
REPAIRS REQUIRED* 
4^. 
^ F 
(Explain) ^?^£-J*-*d&ifQj2_ 
"PC 
) 
) The simulator solution was of the correct kind and 
properly compounded 
' L) The results of this test show that the instrument 
is working properly 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
i o r
 SttSlitffiAAfiZthiJ i n s t r u B , c n t w a s done on 19. 
NompuBuC'Smotum 
2700 West 7839 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
COMM. EXP. 4-4-94 
>1A1L Ut Uliffl Y 
BOUNTY oz^aJ^J^/ci) 
CERTIFIED BJ 
Subscribed 
Notary Public / \ /^ • r /County of Beside^ce_J^it?^^iSC«.. 
4y commission ex,pTr s^X^6 ;^.V___'^ L 19-lJpL-^h 
ADD. 15 
YES 
yi£H_DEPT^_OF_PUBLIC_SA^ (A) 
e the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
1. Breath testing insUrument, INTOXILYZER, serial number 
located &4t^>0UfH ^irt/zdw r-j) ' was properly checked by me/us in 
the course of official duties, on ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ l ^ 1 9?£r at/_^?_#.M. 
2. This was done by a currently certified techinician and according to 
the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah 
Department of Public Safety. 
3. This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were 
made at the time these tests were done. 
4. I am/we are competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the 
matters alleged in this affidavit. 
! FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: YES NO 
0 Electrical power check: 
(Power switch on power indicator light is on) 
"") Temperature check (Ready light is on) 
^^Internal purge check: 
(Air pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds., 
t? Zero set, Error indicator, and Printer Check: 
(Zero set at .000, .001, .002, .003.) 
(With proper zero set, printer works properly)... 
(Printer deactivated when error light is on) 
0^ Fixed absorption calibrator test (if equipped) ^ 
(Reads within +/- .01 of calibration setting).... ( ^ 
y) Checked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests 
within +/- .005 or 5% whichever is the greatest).... • 
O Gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters ^ 
of breath .O , ( ) ( ) 
PAIRS R E Q U I R E D ( E x p l a i n ) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ £ ^ , ^ ^ ^ f ^ ( ) ( ^0 
*0 The simulator solution was of the correct kind and 
properly compounded 
^) The results of this test show that the instrument 
is working properly 
^ 
f 
st prior check of this instrument was do 
CERTIEII-D 
ne o n ^ j J ^ ^ . 1 9 ? . ? ( " 
JESE BREATH TEST^-TECHNICI AN(S ) V ^ 
'ATE OF UTAH ) 
>UNTY 0?jd*AZ-*£&. I/We, on oath, 
me this 
J 
City of Rest<ience__^t?^tr^^<>^fc«-i 
County of Residence_,^j^*=4r*L^!J^a«t*s 
ADD. 16 
ADDENDUM MEM 
Department of Public Safety, Driver License Division, 
Findings of Proceedings on Hearings for 
Administrative Suspension 
t*«£rAn i M e n i u r r u o u s ; ^ m t, 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION 
Findings of Proceedings on Hearing for Administrative Suspension 
(Utah Code Ann. 41-2-130) 
Date of 
Hearing 
Time Set 
For Hearing 
^/f-?z ^'•6<p <ZsJ>-Ut^< 
Name and Address of Attorney 
//jrttfCjU/l B ^ *—'-
U£><5 /- gr^S* ^3<?o 
5cof fjju^ #//// 
Witness 
Witness 
*(*&* t£?ie>M!> C/A 
Name and Address of Driver Hearing Officer 
Arresting Officer 
Date o f^ Birth DL Number' &/0er 
Q ^/TZ^^I/L' 
£/-7-<z>*r 3/^/^/ 11^ Ss^. 
Date of Arrest 
/-<?</- *?<£* 
Location of Hearing 
g.' (,'<? 
Agency 
Witness 
Witness 
^>3d 
OPENING STATEMENT 
This hearing is being conducted at the driver's request in accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and 
Utah Code Ann. 41-2-130, following his/her arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or a combina-
tion of alcohol and drugs. The issue to be determined are: if the peace officer had grounds to believe the driver had been 
in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, was requested to take a chemical 
test, was warned of the potential consequences of taking the test, and was informed of the test results if any. 
All formalities required in court proceedings need not be used in this hearing. However, the Division shall substantially 
comply with the fundamental rules of due process. Sworn testimony will be taken and the parties may have witnesses 
testify. The driver may testify and may cross examine others who testify. 
If the license is suspended the driver has the right within 30 days, to petition the proper court for an appeal hearing. 
Those testifying will be sworn and the hearing shall proceed. 
The following documents and Information are part of the records for this hearing: 
Yes 
*? 
& 
Q 
No 
D 
53 D 
D 
D 
0 
The officer's report submitted in compliance with Utah Code Ann. 41-2-130. 
Notice and citation served by the officer of the Department's intent to suspend, and information on how 
to receive a hearing by the Department. 
Hearing request made within ten days. 
Test machine record of test results, if any. 
Operational checklist of test instrument. 
DI-1006 
Rev. 9-88 
D D Department of Public Safety affidavit that indicates the breath testing instrument was check according to 
Department Standards (41-6-44.3 UCA) 
D D Other (ie. Documents and/or information received in behalf of the friver and/or other evidence received 
which is made official record for the purpose of this hearing). 
Explain: 
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
1. Sworn testimony of officer. 
a. Following are the facts and conclusions presented by the peace officer leading the peace officer to believe the 
party had been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or a combination of alcohol and any drug: 
b. The driver was placed under arrest: No D Yes D Charge(s) 
c. The driver was advised prior to the chemical test that test results could result in suspension of his/her driving 
privilege: No D Yes D 
d. Officer who administered chemical test was certified to do so: No • Yes D 
e. Department procedure and rules were followed by the peace officer in the administration of the chemical 
test: No D Yes D 
e(1) Evidence and/or information received indicating the test machine was • was not • properly working: 
e(2) The driver submitted to a chemical test as requested by a peace officer which showed a reliable test result of 
%. 
Testimony by witness officer or other witness(es): Name: 
2 
Substance of statement and/or questions by driver's legal counsel 
'RESIDING OFFICERS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
\ The peace officer had reason to believe that the driver had D had not • violated Utah Code Ann 41 -6-44 
and was arrested for the same 
3 The driver was D was not • placed under arrest for D U I 
Z The driver was D was not D advised of the possible revocation/suspension of his/her driving privilege 
D The chemical test was • was not • administered by an officer certified to do so 
E Proper procedures and standards were • were not D followed by the peace officer to insure the operation of 
the test machine to be reliable, with the results of % 
" Department of Public Safety affidavit indicated the breath testing instrument used was D was not D reliable 
and in proper working order accodnng to Department Standards (UCA 41-6-44 3) 
3 
w. r^„K,v/v^viuicoanurt?L|uirt?mfei.^ were L£ were not U followed by u ic ^porting officer pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
41-2-130. (Explain what procedures were not followed, if any): 
H. Officer did D did not 30 appear. 
Reasons for non-appearance: Unknown 
I. Additional findings of fact not covered above: 
CONCLUSIONS: 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ALL OF THE STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS REQUIRED TO SUSPEND THE DRIVING PRIVILEGE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. 41-2-130 
WERE XX WERE NOT • PROVIDED IN THIS CASE, AND THE FOLLOWING DECISION IS RENDERED: 
0 To suspend the driving Q Take No Action: 
privilege by authority Explain: 
of Utah Code Ann. 41 -2-130. 
Comments by Presiding Officer: 
No one appeared for the hearing. According to the police report, 
there was reason to make the stop, i.e., excessive speed. There 
was reasonable suspicion that driver was DUI, i.e., her admission that 
she had been drinking, odor of alcohol, slurred and slow speech, 
impaired balance and nystagmus in both eyes. She was arrested for 
DUI, was properly warned and took and breath test. There is a checklist 
for the breath machine in evidence showing that all procedures were 
followed and a test result card with breath sample showing .16 BrAC 
and no indication that there were problems with the test or machine. 
The preponderance of evidence would support a suspension in this 
case. 
ORDER: Suspension of driving privilege. 
Presiding Officer: T * y f^^>c4^X^--^ 
FOR CENTRAL OFFICE USE ONLY 
Reviewed 
074k 
bv: ^+-*^g+~j£< Title: ???s^A*<^20 'U^.fa 
ADDENDUM "F" 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-15 (Supp. 1992) 
ADD. 22 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo 
all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, 
except that the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction over all state agency 
actions relating to removal or placement decisions regarding children in 
state custody. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall 
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of 
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or 
maintains his principal place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial re-
view; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, 
together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the 
agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal 
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceed-
ing; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is 
entitled to obtain judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief 
requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to 
relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of 
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990, ment, effective April 23,1990, added the excep-
ch. 132, § 1. tion at the end of Subsection (l)(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hear-
ing." Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Pro-
Claim to licensure by reciprocity. fessional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. 
Function of district court. App. 1991). 
Claim to licensure by reciprocity. Function of district court. 
District court erred in declining a de novo The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily 
review of a dentist's claim to licensure by reci- delegated to the district court is to review in-
procity, where there had been no proceeding on formal agency adjudicative proceedings. State 
his application that was sufficiently judicial in v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing 1990). 
ADD. 23 
ADDENDUM "G" 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ADD. 24 
Herschel Bullen (0482) ,:s\ \ ^  ^ '" 
MCDONALD & BULLEN
 r%r ,^ VM 
Attorney for Petitioner .--A^ \r-- ^ u*tu 
The Hermes Building , ".{^ 0^  «*' ^ fusV-A'-
455 East Fifth South, Suite 200 ^ ' ,\'\\G-" 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-0999 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
JUDY A, CORDOVA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau 
Chief, Records Bureau, Drivers 
License Division, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 920901040 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Respondent. 
oooOooo 
The above captioned matter came on before the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick on the 30th day of April, 1992, at the hour of 
9:00 a.m., Herschel Bullen appearing for the Petitioner and Thorn 
Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, appearing for the Respondent. 
The Petitioner having made a Motion to Vacate and Set Aside the 
administrative Order suspending the driving privilege of the 
Petitioner, based upon the exhibits received, the pleadings and 
record of the case and having heard argument of counsel, the Court 
now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. An administrative hearing regarding the Department of 
Public Safety Driver's License Division's intention to suspend the 
Petitioner's driving privileges as a result of Petitioner's arrest 
Ann ?^ 
for driving under the influence of alcohol or any drug on January 
24, 1992, was scheduled pursuant to Petitioner's request on or 
about February 19, 1992, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., at 2780 West 
4700 South, West Valley City, Utah. 
2. The record of the administrative suspension hearing 
x-eflects that "no one appeared for the hearing", and no witnesses 
testified whatsoever, not the arresting officer, the operator of 
the breathilyzer, the Petitioner, nor anyone else. The evidence 
apparently considered at the hearing was the arresting officer's 
D.U.I. Report form, a copy of the operational check list, a 
breathilyzer test result, and the Utah Department of Public 
Safety's "record of intoxilyzer test and affidavit" for the day 
January 22, 1992. 
3. The Department of Public Safety issued its Order 
suspending the Petitioner's driving privilege. 
4. The Order of the Department of Public Safety, effective 
12:01, a.m., on February 23, 1992, states that, 
"the basis for such action is findings of fact 
and conclusion by the hearing officer for the 
Department that a peace officer had reasonable 
grounds that you were operating, or were in 
physical control of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence in violation of, or failed 
to request a hearing, contrary toU.C.A. 41-6-
44 and U.C.A. 41-2-130." 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes 
and enters the following 
2 
ADD. 26 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. With respect to Respondent's argument that Petitioner's 
failure to appear at the administrative hearing constitutes a 
waiver of her right to object to the basis of the Respondent's 
Order of Suspension, the Court concludes that that argument is not 
compelling. Though it may have been had the arresting officer or 
other witnesses for the State appeared and testified. 
2. The "residuum rule" set forth in Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 
P.2d 413 (Ct. of App. 1987) is applicable to this fact situation 
and requires that some degree or modicum of competent legal 
evidence support the Respondent agency's findings. 
3. In as much as there was not a residuum of competent legal 
evidence to support the agency's finding, this Court concludes that 
the determination of the Department of Public Safety Driver's 
License Division to suspend the driving privilege of the Plaintiff 
was arbitrary and capricious. 
4. The requirement of a hearing and findings supported by a 
modicum of competent legal evidence is an appropriate and necessary 
safeguard to protect Petitioner and persons similarly situated from 
having their driving privilege taken from them without due process 
of law. 
5. This court is not compelled to hold a trial de novo in all 
cases, otherwise the administrative process would be valueless and 
not subject to judicial review. 
3 
ADD. 27 
6. The objection raised by the Petitioner is not merely 
technical, non-prejudicial and procedural, and trial de novo would 
not be the proper remedy to cure such prejudicial error. 
Dated this day of May, 1992. 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
ADD. 28 
